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 Preface 
The reform of the so-called aid architecture has become a key conceptual and policy issue. 
Certainly the African continent is in the focus of ongoing efforts. When it comes to point new 
ways for more effective modes of Official Development Assistance (ODA), programme-based 
Approaches (PBAs) are an important new model. However, it is not enough to improve the 
aid instruments alone, but to consider side effects which are connected with new approaches. 
The present paper of Mzwanele Mfunwa on “Strengthening Internal Accountability in the 
Context of programme-based Approaches in sub-Saharan Africa” is therefore particularly  
important. PBAs have substantial effects on the internal accountability structures in partner 
countries. In this paper Mzwanele Mfunwa analyses this relevant and often neglected dimen-
sion of ODA reforms. 
This study is the result of a research stay of Dr. Mfunwa at the German Development Institute 
(Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik – DIE) in October and November 2005. Mzwan-
ele Mfunwa works as a Development Management Officer in the Development Policy and 
Management Division (DPMD) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) in Addis Ababa / Ethiopia. 
I would like to thank all persons involved for the very fruitful co-operation with UNECA and 
the concrete collaboration in the context of this study. This applies particularly to the obliging 
and enriching co-operation with Mzwanele Mfunwa. My thanks also go to Professor  
Okey Onyejekwe, who is the Director of UNECA’s Development Policy and Management 
Division. Because of his personal engagement it was possible to create the conditions for the 
co-operation between UNECA and the German Development Institute. Finally I would like to 
thank my colleague Stefan Leiderer, who was a key discussion partner for Mzwanele Mfunwa 
in the course of the preparation of the present study.  
 
Dr. Stephan Klingebiel  Bonn, March 2006 
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Summary 
The nascent democratic process since the 1990s in Africa has given rise to the need to nurture, 
expand and entrench this process in all African countries. In a rising number of countries, 
democratic electoral transitions are becoming the constitutionally accepted mechanism for 
changes of power. By 2005 several African governments have been in their third successive 
era of democratic changeover of leadership. Important also, Africa’s political dispensation is 
increasingly becoming more inclusive of all social groups, contributing to political stability. 
As a demonstration of a commitment to institute good governance as the way forward, by 
January 2006 25 African countries had acceded to the New Partnership for Africa’s Develop-
ment’s (NEPAD’s) African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 
Despite these advances, the democratic process in the continent is still fragile, and the emerg-
ing governance structures (political parties, civil society organizations, elected institutions of 
the legislature and the executive) remain weak and largely un-institutionalised. More efforts 
are needed to nurture these institutions as Africa strives to achieve economic progress and 
political development. 
These efforts will need to include more active support of international actors. Already, these 
actors have received democratic developments in Africa with admiration, buttressed by mag-
nanimous gestures. On the poverty side, such gestures are underpinned by donor-inspired new 
ways of tackling poverty. In particular, the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) processes 
seek to ensure that policy-making, implementation and evaluation are no longer the exclusive 
preserve of the executive, but are greatly shaped by ordinary citizens themselves. The PRSP 
processes were partly intended to balance accountability of governments to both their domes-
tic constituents and to donors, as well as donors’ accountability to developing countries.  
Following a deep assessment, external actors found major flaws in their previous aid interven-
tions in Africa, which rendered aid ineffective on the poverty front. In the 2005 Paris Declara-
tion these actors resolved to “take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the way we 
deliver and manage aid.” They became convinced that programme-based approaches, includ-
ing general budget support and sector-wide approaches, are superior to conventional project-
based approaches of the past, as modalities of delivering aid. The donors are now conceiving 
ways to make use of these modalities in a way that effectively strengthens internal account-
ability rather than undermine it. 
The new aid modalities contain key elements of good governance that are supposed to ensure 
country ownership of programmes, transparency, accountability and participation of the citi-
zenry. Because of these elements, these modalities are a vast improvement over past ways of 
delivering aid, and hold a promise to “strengthen governance and improve development per-
formance,” as the Paris Declaration states. 
Despite these and other positive advances these new ways of delivering aid contain, still a 
plethora of implementation shortfalls exists. In particular the ideals of participation by the 
poor, the accountability of governments to their own citizens and the anticipated strong over-
sight by state institutions seem elusive. On the PRSP process, for example, the longstanding 
relationships between low-income countries and the World Bank / International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) based on conditionality however often stresses external accountability over do-
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mestic one (World Bank / IMF 2005). Partly, this is ascribed to the negative ‘externalities’ 
from aid itself that have forced heavily aid-dependent countries to continue accounting exclu-
sively to external actors. 
Addressing these pitfalls requires various corrective measures that some donors are already 
adopting or considering. As per the Paris Declaration to “help strengthen [partner countries’] 
capacity to exercise [proper leadership and accountability],” these measures include building 
capacity of parliaments on public finance management to enable effective budget oversight. 
Bolstering skills of Civil society organization (CSOs) to supplement parliamentary oversight 
efforts is a raison d’être of some donors. 
These measures notwithstanding, donors are still facing a number of dilemmas. Country sov-
ereignty, fungibility of money and thus unclear link to poverty, and ‘grey areas’ (e.g. whether 
parliaments are pursuing public or party political interests) are some of these dilemmas. The 
historical channelling of aid via extra-budgetary projects and CSOs in the face of government 
capacity constraints is a source of heated debate. Furthermore, critiques have registered un-
ease at the ‘excessive’ assistance to CSOs that further weakens state capacity. 
The paper concludes that donor influence on recipient government accountability has largely 
been positive recently, and is likely to evolve in a supportive direction. Non-government or-
ganizations have been at the forefront of the new development thinking; and now donor gov-
ernments too are increasingly following suit in using aid leverage to support democracy (ra-
ther than pursuing their own geo-political interest as a primary goal) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, as this new direction evolves external actors must ensure that the new aid modali-
ties do not strengthen external, at the expense of internal, accountability of governments – an 
outcome that will undermine the effectiveness of aid itself and the budding democratic proc-
ess currently underway in Africa. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Context 
The 1990s saw a wave of democratisation sweeping across the continent of Africa in ways 
never seen before. New governments took power through the ballot rather than the bullet, in 
relatively fair and free election, and armed with mandates to pursue good governance and 
poverty reduction (UNECA 2004). Good governance is propagated to uphold the rule of law, 
strengthening and respecting institutions that create checks and balances on governments (e.g. 
independent judiciary, offices of auditor general and ombudsman) undergirded by sound con-
stitutions.  
Encouraged by continental bodies such as the African Union (AU) and its programme, the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the salient elements of democracy are 
emerging too, exemplified by the increasing efforts towards being more transparent and ac-
countable to the electorate. Broader participation in policy-making, implementation, monitor-
ing and evaluation is also taking hold (UNECA 2004). 
In this new environment donors took stock of the aid impact on poverty, and found it to be 
unsatisfactory. Accordingly, in the 2005 Paris Declaration (High Level Forum 2005) they 
undertook to reconfigure their historical aid interventions to not only support, but also gain 
from Africa’s democratic transition. The donors became convinced that programme-based 
approaches, including general budget support and sector-wide approaches, are superior to 
conventional project-based approaches of the past, as modalities of delivering aid. They are 
now conceiving ways to make use of these modalities in a way that effectively strengthens 
internal accountability rather than undermine it. On paper at least, recent initiatives such as 
new frameworks for aid delivery appear appropriately calibrated to embed both the economic 
and political content at their core to suit the new democratic order.  
The historical government-donor relationship is also under review. African governments used 
to account exclusively donors on the use of donated funds; and donors’ technical assistance 
was largely aimed at building governments’ capacities on public finance management. Little 
effort was made to account to the citizens on policy formulation and implementation. 
The central thesis of this paper is that the new modalities of delivering aid constitute a vast 
improvement over the past ways. These improvements concern harmonisation, ownership by 
governments, and accountability of governments towards donors among others. But at the 
same time these new modalities create new problems, including the possibility that donors 
engaging in programme-based approaches and budget support may actually be undermining 
internal democratic accountability. Therefore, the main hypothesis is that donors have not 
sufficiently taken this possibility into account. 
In broad terms “accountability refers to a chain of relationships in which actors are account-
able upwards (to donors and other actors…), downwards (to target groups and benefi-
ciaries…) and inwards (to organizational missions, visions and values)” (Cornwall / 
Lucas / Pasteur 2000). Accountability manages the power relations between actors, which 
interact or affect each other directly or indirectly. It can be understood as ‘giving an account’ 
to another party who has a stake in what has been done. The core dimensions of accountabil-
ity are: transparency; participation; evaluation; and complaints and redress (ODI 2005). 
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This paper distinguishes between two types of accountability, namely, external and internal 
(or domestic) accountability. External accountability in this context refers to accountability of 
aid-receiving governments to international donor community, including international financial 
institutions, creditors and foundations.  
Internal accountability refers to accountability of aid-receiving governments to their own peo-
ple on policy-making and outcomes. Internal accountability entails, among others, openness 
to parliaments, civil society organizations and the media. 
The scope of the paper is rather limited. The paper does not provide a blueprint on ways to 
ensure effective internal accountability, but simply flags at a conceptual level some issues for 
deeper research, analyses and debates. Even though the paper is deliberately general, there is a 
slight sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) flavour. SSA is a region with the world’s highest incidence 
of poverty. Since the mid-1990s however SSA’s conditions have improved over a broad front: 
economic fundamentals have changed for the better, and political governance has displayed 
profound progress and huge reversals seem unlikely (UNECA 2004). The overriding chal-
lenge is for these welcome trends to help SSA extricate herself from the pervasive poverty. 
The paper therefore joins a chorus of other attempts in a search for lasting solutions to the 
region’s problems, and to support ongoing positive developments. Indeed, the new aid mo-
dalities have a great potential to make an important contribution in supporting these develop-
ments. 
The rest of this chapter explains the key objectives and characteristics of the new develop-
ment approaches, and contrasts these with the old approaches. The section also highlights 
some prerequisites of internal accountability.  
Section 2 gives an approbatory mention of how donors have initiated new development ap-
proaches, while arguing that the reluctance to integrate these new approaches in operational 
activities constitutes a key practical weakness in this new approach. Indeed, it is the conten-
tion of this paper that some of the new aid delivery approaches are actually being imple-
mented in a way that further strengthens external accountability, while at best doing nothing 
to promote internal accountability. 
Section 3 discusses various actions external actors are engaged in to support internal account-
ability including through capacity building. These efforts notwithstanding, section 4 outlines 
some dilemmas in applying the new development approach. Lastly, section 5 summarises the 
paper and draws conclusions. 
1.2 The nature of new development approaches: an improvement over past ways 
The 2005 Paris Declaration presents a clear intention on the part of the international donor 
community to make a clean break with the past ways of giving development aid to poor coun-
tries. In the Declaration, donors resolved to “take far-reaching and monitorable actions to 
reform the ways we deliver and manage aid” (par. 1) These actions will be taken partly with a 
distinct goal of “enhancing donors’ and partner countries’ respective accountability to their 
citizens and parliament for their development policies, strategies and performance” (par. 
3(iii)). 
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Specific actions that donors promised to take include respecting partner country leadership 
and “help strengthen capacity to exercise it” (par. 15) Such capacity building support should 
be based “not only ….on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader 
social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human re-
sources” (par. 22). Furthermore, as an attempt to ‘do no harm’ to existing government ac-
countability structures and systems, donors promised to “avoid, to the maximum extent possi-
ble, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and implementation of aid-
financed projects and programmes” (par. 21). 
The new modalities of aid delivery attempt to capture the spirit of Paris Declaration in their 
formulation and implementation. The programme-based approaches (PBAs), including gen-
eral budget support (GBS) and sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) (Box 1) provide a good ex-
ample in this regard. PBAs are programmatic approaches that have a “recognizable concep-
tual roof, are answered for, endorsed and managed by the partner countries (including the 
effective coordination of donors) and supported by donors that adjust their behaviour to the 
concept” (Klingebiel / Leiderer / Schmidt, 2005).  
 
Box 1: Distinction between “new” sector-wide approach from “old” project approach 
Sector-wide approach Conventional project approach 
– Country holistic view on entire sector – Focus on projects to support narrowly defined 
objectives 
– Partnership with mutual trust and shared ac-
countability 
– Recipient accountable to donor 
– External partners’ coordination and collective 
dialogue 
– Bilateral negotiations and agreements 
– Increased use of local procedures – Parallel implementation arrangements 
– Long-term capacity/system development in 
sector 
– Short-term disbursement and success of pro-
jects 
– Process-oriented approach through learning by 
doing 
– Blueprint approach 
Source: OECD/DAC 2003 
Programme-based approaches are based on four key principles, namely:1 
— Leadership of the programme by the recipient country; 
— A single programme with a common budget framework; 
— Donor coordination and harmonization of procedures; and 
— Efforts to increase the use of the processes and systems of partner governments. 
 
                                                 
1  Klingebiel / Leiderer / Schmidt (2005). 
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The new development approach is intended to address the deficiencies of past approaches, 
which included:2 
— High transactions costs from the multiplicity of different reporting and accounting  
requirements including tied aid; 
— Inefficient spending dictated by donor priorities and procurement arrangements; 
— Extremely unpredictable funding levels and flows; 
— Undermining of state systems through special staffing arrangements and parallel struc-
tures; 
— Corrosion of democratic accountability as mechanisms are designed to satisfy donor 
rather than domestic constituencies; 
— Hard to sustain positive impact beyond the short term, with high level of reliance on 
donor funds which undermined sustainability; and 
— Corruption, fraud and rent seeking that characterised the management of projects and 
which were not overcome by their independence from government. 
A key feature in the new approach to poverty reduction is the poverty reduction strategy paper 
(PRSP) process (Box 2), which represents a commitment to engage the poor meaningfully. 
This emphasis on participation includes inviting community civil society organizations to 
partake in poverty analysis, and implementation and monitoring of relevant programmes  
(Draman / Langdon 2005). In sum, the poverty reduction strategy (PRSs) processes are ide-
ally drafted by the recipient countries themselves through the direct involvement of citizenry 
(for example, community meetings) or via civil society organizations representing various 
interest groups, and thus leads to country ownership. 
The new development approach seeks to reinforce mutual accountability for development 
results, in particular accountability between government and donors and government to citi-
zens (Box 3). 
In this context, the main challenge for the donor community is to behave in a manner that at 
the same time promotes internal accountability.  
 
                                                 
2  See for example OECD/DAC (2003). 
Box 2: Principles of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Processes    
Country-driven, involving broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector in all operational 
steps 
Results-oriented, and focused on outcomes that would benefit the poor; 
Comprehensive in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty, but also 
Prioritized so that implementation is feasible, in both fiscal and institutional terms; 
Partnership-oriented, involving coordinated participation of development partners (bilateral, multilateral, and 
non-governmental); 
Based on a medium- and long-term perspective for poverty reduction, recognizing that sustained poverty re-
duction cannot be achieved overnight. 
Source: World Bank (2002, 3) 
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Box 3: Evolving form of accountability 
1. Traditional aid accountability  
 
– The donor does not hold itself directly accountable to the public for development 
outcomes in the countries it supports; 
– There is no causal link between donor input and development outcomes; and 
– Accountability by the developing country to the donor not primary concern. 
2. New aid accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– The donor and recipient government are jointly accountable for the success of the  
aid support; and  
– The recipient government is accountable to its own people. 
 
Source: Crown Agents Institutional Development Group (2003) 
1.3 The rationale for internal accountability 
In an era in which country ownership, sustainability of programmes and policies and aid ef-
fectiveness are important, the international aid community must strive for effective internal 
accountability. In the past, mere external accountability has proven insufficient on a sustain-
able basis. External accountability tended to be purely input-based rather than outcome-based.  
The 1980s provide a stark example to illustrate this point. That decade is now regarded as 
‘lost’ because the living standards of most Africans dropped sharply to less than the 1960s’ 
levels. Ironically, the official development assistance (ODA) to Africa rose meteorically from 
4 percent of GDP in 1980 to nearly 10 percent in 1989. In real terms, foreign aid doubled dur-
Donor Agency Project Agency Developing Country
Government 
Citizens/Service 
Consumers 
Donor Govern 
ment/Tax Payer 
External 
Partners 
Sector Prog-
ramme 
Developing Country 
Government 
Citizens/Service 
Consumers 
Donor Gov-
ernment/Tax 
Payers 
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ing the 1980s from $7.6 billion a year to $15 billion. Furthermore, $6 billion of debt was can-
celled (Meredith 2005). 
In a 1989 report, the World Bank proclaimed: “Africa’s economic malaise had political as 
well as economic roots.” As a solution, the Bank called for the “strengthening [of] account-
ability, by encouraging public debate, and by nurturing a free press…fostering grassroots 
and non-government organizations…”(World Bank 1989). 
Moreover, effective internal accountability is in the donor community’s interest in that it sup-
posedly leads to long-term sustainability of projects, country ownership and support, and lo-
wer monitoring and transactions costs. 
The increased use of GBS as an aid delivery tool in recent years, coupled with the decline in 
project support and conditionalities, further justify efforts to boost internal accountability. The 
rapid growth of budget-support operations recently informed a new aid philosophy that stres-
ses flexible funding for country-led poverty reduction efforts. In some countries the GBS a-
mounts to 40 per cent or more of government budget (Lawson et al. 2005). 
Finally, internal accountability contains another key spin-off as well: it constrains the elected 
representatives’ tendency of wilfully deviating from their responsibilities, and further helps to 
reduce incidences of corruption. 
1.4 Prerequisites for effective internal accountability in the budget process 
Key ingredients for effective internal accountability include the following (UNECA 2005a): 
Political setting and set-up. In principle, putting aid funds in the budget enhances local con-
trol over them, and requires strong checks and balances in the political system. This calls for 
technically capable parliaments to scrutinise public finances effectively, which further re-
quires enhanced political role of parliament both in law and administration. In sum, in the 
absence of the ‘right’ political environment for state organs to function, internal accountabil-
ity will founder. In such an environment new development initiatives such as GBS will be ill 
suited as an aid delivery vehicle (Lawson et al. 2005). 
Participation. “Participation contributes to three objectives: (broad-based) ownership, ac-
countability, and pro-poor effectiveness” (Molenaers / Renard 2005). The executive must play 
a catalytic role in the creation of legislative and administrative environment for citizen par-
ticipation. Additionally, legislatures themselves should open their proceedings to the media 
and the public, and should invite outside submissions and experts to testify.  
Stronger parliament/civil society partnership is encouraged to enhance domestic budget 
management and outcomes. For CSOs, the legislature is a primary channel for influencing 
budgetary decision-making. From the legislature’s perspective, the input of CSOs can help the 
legislature’s effective engagement with the budget. For example, some CSOs are providing 
budget training to legislative staff and members, and produce accessible guides to the budget 
process. CSOs’ expertise can boost the capacity of legislative committees to conduct inde-
pendent analysis of the budget (Krafchik 2005). This partnership is important when legislative 
research capacity is inadequate. 
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Transparency of budgeting processes. Transparency can be facilitated through the demysti-
fication of the budget, which could be achieved by producing simple summaries and presenta-
tions that a non-technical person can understand. Second, by transparency of participation at 
national and local government levels to build trust, ownership, and support among all stake-
holders (UNECA 2005a). 
2 Limitations of internal accountability mechanisms for budgetary 
oversight 
Ironically, the new and improved modalities of delivering aid and the development agenda 
have sparked heated and widespread debate regarding their efficacy to reduce poverty. This 
section highlights some areas of controversy as these relate to internal accountability and, by 
extension, to democracy itself. 
2.1 Aid: good but adverse side effects abound in its current form 
A growing number of external actors is trying to exercise “good donorship” (ODI 2005) by 
honouring their undertakings. In the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness donors un-
dertook to enhance their own and  
“partner countries’ respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their 
development policies, strategies and performance.” Furthermore, donors committed 
themselves “to taking concrete and effective action to address the …challenges, includ-
ing weaknesses in partner countries’ institutional capacities to develop and implement 
results-driven national development strategies.” 
For these undertakings and efforts, donors deserve plaudits for striving to ensure effectiveness 
of aid and increase the prospects of sustainable development after they have departed. Indeed, 
if donor-initiated PRSP processes are well implemented they could very well serve to 
strengthen democracy and governments’ accountability efforts to their citizens, and thus fulfil 
their Paris undertaking. 
Conclusions of several studies however argue that aid delivery in its current form, is thwart-
ing efforts of making partner countries to account to their own citizens (including through 
parliaments). Djankov / Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) study results show that aid has a 
statistically significant and negative effect on democratic institutions. On average, countries 
with above average aid receipts relative to GDP show a political deterioration. The study con-
cludes that a country receiving more foreign aid than three-quarters of the countries in the 
sample, over a period of five years, can expect to see a decline in the index of democracy by 
0.6–1 point on a scale of 1–10. 
Thus, aid can have  
“unintended and often undesired consequences, such as a reduced legitimacy of formal 
laws, a weakening of the domestic accountability of government actions, a reduced le-
gitimacy of formally elected legislative and executive bodies, the capture of donor money 
by self-interested elites that dominate state power behind a technocratic façade, and in-
creased political instability” (Dijkstra 2005). 
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How can a large amount of aid reduce the incentives for democratic accountability? When 
revenues do not depend on the taxes raised locally, there is less incentive for accountability. 
Aid therefore may fetter the pace of improvements of state institutions and government ac-
countability by (Harford / Klein 2005): 
— Supporting poor governments and remove the pressure for reform; 
— Aid can create a ‘moral hazard’ problem, meaning that governments can spend money 
without a firm budget constraint, confident that donors will bail them out of any diffi-
culty; 
— Aid siphons skilled workers away from government; 
— Recipients overstretch themselves. In a situation where focusing on priorities is impor-
tant, recipients will often prefer to expand their operations to cover whatever projects 
donors wish to fund; and  
— Aid fuels patronage and sparks fights over rents. 
Second, aid can elevate external accountability above internally accountability because of 
lack of capacity on the part of government. According to Christiansen (2005) a government 
with limited capacity generates distrust among external actors as they treat with scepticism all 
government systems. External actors then work round these systems through projects on de-
velopment and humanitarian issues. Because of this, the state is further undermined, as its 
systems remain idle. Government legitimacy becomes eroded, as government fails to deliver. 
Alternative power basis build up around those who have access to external resources. The 
accountability and responsibility of government becomes increasingly irrelevant as it loses 
control over policy and on service delivery. State planning and policy-making processes be-
come increasingly pointless, as resources are too unpredictable and too scarce. Line ministries 
turn directly to donors. “Atomised, projectised donor support” results in inconsistent policies 
and inefficient programmes emerging. Donors lose even more faith in government capacity, 
and thus put on increasingly stringent conditions and demands on their aid. State accountabil-
ity shifts more and more upwards to donors. Both non-government and government actors 
relate more and more directly to donors as sources of influence and finance rather than their 
own government. 
On the last point at least, the new programme-based approaches serve to counter some of the 
anomalies in that they bring governments back into the centre of the accountability stage, at 
least towards the donors. Here, governments are re-empowered to act as the main source of 
public service delivery under close monitoring by donors of budget support. As the paper ar-
gues throughout, this tends to strengthen external, and erode internal, accountability. 
2.2 Limited parliaments’ involvement in budgetary processes 
The international debate is framed as a tension between the roles of the executive and the leg-
islature – between technicality and democracy. In virtually all countries it is accepted that the 
executive has a mandate to prepare the budget, as it possesses the most comprehensive infor-
mation on which to base revenue and expenditure decisions (Krafchik / Wehner 2003).  
From a democracy’s angle, parliaments’ role in the budget process should remain significant 
however. The budget is an important economic policy tool of government, and indicates the 
nation’s priorities. As the representative of the people, parliament is best placed to ensure that 
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the budget best matches the nation’s needs with resources. This ability is especially critical 
considering limited resources, and demands detailed engagement with the budget.  
In many sub-Saharan African countries, parliament’s powers to engage with and change the 
budget are not defined, with the ultimate result that the parliamentary budget process is large-
ly of symbolic value (UNECA 2005b). 
Even though it is not for donors to prescribe a political set up of parliamentary involvement in 
the budget process, the main idea nonetheless is to see to it that parliaments are involved. Yet 
many donors shy away from helping improve parliaments’ capacity when they can do so. Be-
ing considered ‘too political’ and therefore ‘too sensitive’, political party development (an 
entry point to assisting parliaments) has for a long time ranked lowest in the list of interna-
tional policy priorities for development cooperation. As a result, most assistance has gone into 
strengthening of the civil society sector often at the expense of political parties. Indeed, some 
commentators have wondered aloud whether “the disproportionate international attention for 
civil society development has not unintentionally undermined the growth of political parties in 
some developing countries (Schoofs / de Zeeuw 2004)”. 
To be sure, civil society actors are adept at expressing specific demands, but are less suitable 
at aggregating broad societal interests. Interest aggregation and other democratic functions 
can only be performed by political parties that in most cases, however, lack the resources to 
do so (Dijkstra 2005). 
Increased legislative participation can bring several benefits. For example, greater transpar-
ency and openness through such participation help to curb corruption. This in turn engenders 
efficiency and effectiveness in spending, and enhances public debate, which fosters consensus 
about budget choices. 
Limited involvement of parliaments in the budget processes also manifests itself in the PRSP 
process. For starters, involvement in PRS processes by parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa has 
been limited in scope and is the exception rather than the rule (Dijkstra 2005). In some cases, 
it has been restricted to participation by individual members of parliaments in consultation 
sessions, mostly without institutional participation by parliaments. Partly, this marginalization 
of parliaments stems from donors’ traditional focus on the executive, and to the notion that 
equates participation with civil society actors.  
2.3 Civil society participation needs strengthening 
Since the 1990s, civil society organizations (CSOs) have played a larger role in the budget 
process in many developing countries. This enhanced role corresponds with the political trend 
towards democratisation. The majority of these CSOs or ‘budget groups’ (Krafchik 2005) 
operate independently of the country government and political parties, and thus provide an 
effective oversight function to public budgeting.  
These budget groups share a common agenda that recognises the value of budget processes, 
independent oversight and a commitment to pro-poor choices within existing resource en-
velop. 
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Another key function of CSOs in the budgeting process is that their activities often comple-
ment budget oversight within legislatures and increase coverage of budget issues in the media. 
A partnership between CSOs and legislatures, as alluded to earlier, is often the starting point 
for the development of local independent budget work. This symbiotic partnership has had 
civil society build research expertise that is lacking in legislatures, while legislatures had 
given voice to civil society’s concerns during budget debates. 
Furthermore, some CSOs participate in auditing public finances. This participation can lead to 
sound public finance management by, first, providing independent information on the impact 
of the budget on poor and low-income citizens. Second, it helps to build budget literacy a-
mong citizens and facilitate discussions and debates on budgetary issues within civil society. 
Third, it enables CSOs to collate, synthesize, and disseminate information on public finances; 
it thereby adds new data into the budget process. Finally, civil society budget groups provide 
training on public finances to citizen groups, the media, and legislatures, thereby strengthen-
ing the capacity of all of these groups to exercise oversight over budget process and to de-
mand accountability from government agencies (Ramkumar / Krafchik 2005). 
Notwithstanding these benefits, the donors are confronted by a number of issues in assisting 
CSOs. Key among these is the problematic of ‘excessive’ reliance on CSOs that creates a 
danger of replacing legitimate state organs and thus thwarting efforts to strengthen those or-
gans. This matter is discussed further below. 
2.4 Effective participation: the missing element in the PRSP processes 
The poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) processes were partly intended to balance ac-
countability of governments to both their domestic constituents and to donors, as well as do-
nors’ accountability to developing countries. The longstanding relationships between low-
income countries and the World Bank / IMF based on conditionality however often stresses 
external, over internal, accountability (World Bank / IMF 2005). 
Second, there are concerns that little discussion is entertained about what macroeconomic 
framework is most suited to reduce poverty during the PRSP process (Dijkstra 2005). In the 
view of some CSOs, the opportunity to participate in their government’s economic policy 
making is rendered meaningless because the policy space enjoyed by governments is so lim-
ited as to prevent any effective policy debate among different groups. And hence, macroeco-
nomic policy is still shaped exclusively by donors led by the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Third, mention is often made of the lack of involvement in the PRS process by critical politi-
cal decision-makers and representative bodies such as parliaments.3 As mentioned before, the 
focus on CSOs in PRS formulation may have drawn attention away from the involvement of 
these representative bodies, thereby bypassing existing processes of deliberation and dialogue. 
And, fourth, the views of poor people are only marginally reflected in PRSs. This is in part 
because direct engagement of this marginalized group takes more time than existing planning 
cycles allow (Molenaers / Renard 2005). Furthermore, vulnerable, marginalized, and dis-
                                                 
3  Dijkstra 2005, ibid. 
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empowered populations generally have less voice, weaker networks, and suffer more from the 
effects of non-income poverty than the average poor person. This form of powerlessness re-
sults in their exclusion from the generation of information and adjustment of policies and ac-
tions, which affect them. This, in turn, prevents policymakers’ accountability to citizens 
through the “long route” of accountability. For this purpose, decentralization efforts on key 
policy issues and administration could possibly help address the exclusion problem of the 
poor. 
3 Capable parliaments and CSOs to ensure accountability: the roles of 
the donor community 
Donors have a role in supporting internal accountability. They need to “ensure that the condi-
tions really make aid effective and are agreed in a manner which does not distort or under-
mine countries’ own strategies or processes, and that we make a clean break from past prac-
tice which sought to enforce particular policy choices”.4 In sum, donors must (Healey et al. 
2000): 
— Ensure accountability of national spending priorities to domestic constituencies rather 
than to themselves; 
— Help find mechanisms for empowering the poor directly or indirectly; 
— Set realistic standards for institutional and policy change when judging acceptable per-
formance for offering debt reduction under the HIPC agreement; 
— Help work out ways in which public spending and service provision can more effec-
tively be converted into desired poverty reduction outcomes (e.g. reduced infant mortal-
ity or improved health or education among the poorest groups); and  
— Help increase public expenditure on poverty objectives consistent with macroeconomic 
stability through external provision of more predictable, medium-term financial support 
for domestic budgets. 
To effectively carry out internal checks and balance on budgeting processes, capacities are 
needed on technical (budget, the content of the PRS priority actions, etc.) and on processes 
(coalition building, negotiation skills, and others) across all actors endowed with different and 
complementary knowledge and skills. 
There is little doubt however about the positive influence external donors, especially NGOs, 
have had in promoting democracy in general and internal accountability in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa. Donor agencies have redesigned their aid interventions, taking the cue from 
NGOs, for deeper impact on poverty and good governance that underpins it. 
This section is about actions taken by donors to rectify existing pitfalls in the implementation 
of new modalities. It is early yet to ascertain the success of these efforts, particularly in light 
of still insignificant donor harmonisation of aid interventions. 
                                                 
4  Statement by Hilary Benn, U.K. Secretary of State for International Development, on the topic “The Re- 
view of World Bank Conditionality”; online: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/conditionality-
statement.pdf  
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3.1 Using aid leverage to enhance internal accountability 
There is a heightened awareness among the donor community that without internal account-
ability, aid will eventually prove ineffectual in the ultimate objective of reducing poverty. 
Accordingly, donors are urged to use their aid leverage to prod governments to be more ac-
countable. 
Underpinning these efforts is a sense that just because aid delivery may have caused problems 
in the past, as Djankov / Montalvo / Reynal-Querol (2005) argue, does not mean that it cannot 
be improved. Contrary to the views noted earlier, some commentators note that large aid 
flows actually helped to improve governance in many African countries from the 1990s, rais-
ing hope that methods of delivering aid may have improved. The programme activities of the 
Bretton Woods institution, it is argued, have increasingly reflected participation of the citizens 
of countries. These organizations’ PRSP process as a compulsory prior action for debt relief 
under the highly indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative serves to illustrate this point.  
In the recent past, some donors have taken action to avert potential damage that aid can cause. 
Such action, for example, has taken the form of withdrawing aid if it swells government bud-
gets and thus discourages reform or the growth of accountable institutions. Another form is to 
closely control aid flows if aid generates rents, fuels patronage and is likely to lead to corrup-
tion. 
3.2 Commitment to good governance 
The G8 countries resolved to forgive debt and increase aid to countries that are exercising 
good governance. This is a good sign that needs to be followed by a clear understanding of 
what ‘good governance’ means. Is it the state of good governance or progress towards that 
state? In the latter case, governments are enjoined to open democratic space; practise eco-
nomic management; ensure participation; entrench transparency in law and practice. Yet a 
move towards good governance has cost implications too, that require enhanced assistance 
still (UNECA 2004). To avoid an ‘chicken and egg’ situation therefore, governments have to 
show progress, and demonstrate through effecting and abiding by rule of laws, among rela-
tively costless exercises. 
Donors should observe and assess recipient governments on the basis to which they are com-
mitted to the principles of transparency, participation, free and active civil society including 
the media – all prerequisites for effective accountability in general and internal accountability 
in particular.  
3.3 Empowering parliamentarians 
Ideally, participation by parliament must take place at all levels of the budget stages: drafting, 
legislating, execution, and audit. In this regard, enhanced measures that could be adopted by 
the donor community to strengthen parliaments are: (a) strengthening the legal and political 
conditions in the countries; (b) promoting the functional capacity of parliaments; (c) strength-
ening interaction with other actors; and (d) improving the international donor policy environ-
ment for the legislatures (Eberlei / Heun, (2003). 
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Legislatures need access to research capacity to make sound budgetary decisions. Some of the 
more activist legislatures, in budgetary terms, have substantial budget research capacity (e.g. 
US Congressional Budget Office). In Uganda the 2001 Budget Act created a Parliamentary 
Budget Office staffed with 13 economists. 
Few donors and institutions have become involved in parliamentary promotion so far, as ex-
pounded earlier. Those few donors include the World Bank, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that are 
running parliamentary promotion programmes. The World Bank has three promotional com-
ponents: parliament control, parliaments and poverty reduction, and parliamentary networks. 
One result of this is the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank, which organises consulta-
tions and training for 140 participating parliamentarians from 60 countries. The promoted 
networks also include the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption. 
The UNDP has various capacity building measures aimed at improving parliamentary control 
and legislative competence. Training and exchange programmes are also carried out jointly 
with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in some cases. Additionally, the UNDP is promot-
ing parliamentary reform processes. In the PRS countries in sub-Saharan Africa, however, the 
overall scope of UNDP measures is very small. 
As with most bilateral donors, parliamentary promotion in official German Development Co-
operation is a comparatively small field in relationship to development cooperation as a 
whole. A special feature of German development co-operation is the role played by the politi-
cal foundations, which are affiliated to the main political parties but autonomous in the con-
duct of their activities. There are six such foundations promoting democratic development and 
respect for human rights in developing countries with funding from the federal budget for 
development co-operation (OECD/DAC 2006, 23).  
The programmes of these foundations are however mainly geared towards parties, parliamen-
tary committees and groups or individual parliamentarians, and less on technical support for 
parliaments as an institution in its own right.  
Several donor organizations are now taking steps to increase the capacity of parliaments in 
public finance management (PFM). They focus not only on the parliamentarians within the 
sub-committees of finance, but also on the parliamentary administration to ensure continuity 
even after the end of the term for incumbent parliamentarians. 
As one of the criteria for selecting parliamentarians to partner with, some donors avoid work-
ing with dominant parliamentarians coming from the ruling party or where there are severe 
cases of bad governance (e.g. as in Equatorial Guinea). 
On strengthening parliaments in the PRS processes, a number of initiatives have been put in 
place. These can be aggregated as follows (Eberlei / Henn 2003): 
National legal and political conditions. This is aimed at promoting parliamentary reform 
and to embed programmes designed to promote good governance in general, as well as within 
the framework of general political dialogue. 
Functional capacity. This is geared towards capacity building and resource development to 
narrow the gap between the functional performance of parliaments and their constitutional 
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scope. The activity seeks to reduce existing shortfalls in parliamentary work – the low stan-
dard of information for members of parliaments and limited functionality due to lack of re-
sources. 
Legislation. The initiative is aimed at equipping parliaments to ably evaluate the executive’s 
legislative proposals in terms of their impact on poverty and present its own legislative initia-
tives aimed at reducing poverty. 
Budgetary powers. Enables responsible committees to analyse the budget in detail in terms 
of its impact on poverty, and where appropriate propose precise changes to parliament. 
Oversight. In general, capacity building in this area includes control functions; strengthening 
the relevant committees; systematic improvement of the information flows between constitu-
tional control institutions (e.g. Auditor General) and parliamentary committees (which also 
requires improved capacity in the parliamentary administration). There is a need to strike a 
balance between the necessary substantive inputs and preserving the sovereignty of the par-
liament is considerably more apparent in capacity building and parliamentary reform initia-
tives than in measures to improve resources.  
Interaction with other actors. As noted previously, interaction and cooperation between 
parliament and civil society has high potential relevance for poverty reduction. Such coopera-
tion would be in areas of analysis and discussion of the annual budget, control of expenditure 
and implementation of PRS principles in sectoral programmes – cooperation that can to be 
promoted by the donor community. As in the case of South Africa, the aim should be to insti-
tutionalise cooperation (as opposed to ad hoc activities). 
International donor policy environment. The strong focus of donors on civil society par-
ticipation in the PRSP processes, as argued above, has generally led to an implicit weakening 
of parliaments. In this regard, the IMF and the World Bank should not accept PRSP process 
submitted by the executive of a country without approval by a parliament. In addition, to 
strengthen parliaments the two organizations must require “parliamentary approval of loans 
and financial assistance” before extending them to governments (IMF 2005).  
3.4 Selecting and empowering CSOs 
Despite their immense potential to promote internal accountability (for example, see Box 4), 
in many low-income countries civil society is weakly organized and embryonic. Moreover, it 
is unclear to what extent some of these organizations represent the interest of the poor. What 
abounds in the PRSP processes are development CSOs, but they are said to be “mainly urban, 
professional, donor-bred and fed with unclear links with grass-roots organizations, and often 
disconnected from the sectors they claim to represent” (Molenaers / Renard 2005). 
Furthermore, governments have been accused of inviting CSOs that fit their preferences, from 
traditional religious leaders to representative of the business community to youth movements. 
There is thus no guarantee of a built-in participation by the poor. 
The same argument goes to attempts of assisting the media. In cases where the state has al-
lowed a proliferation of media outlets, these outlets have been found to be highly biased. 
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Hence, donors may find it difficult to determine the appropriate outlet(s) with whom to part-
ner in offering training and skills development (Howard 2003). 
The steps that donor community can insist on and participate in, as part of pursuing ‘good 
governance’ to strengthen civil society participation in the legislature include: 
— Open the legislature and its committees to the media and the general public; 
— Make information before the legislature publicly available, including committee  
reports; 
— Call for submissions on the budget and legislation, and invite outside experts; 
— Educate civil society about legislative procedure, and needs; and  
— Engage with civil society about what is needed to establish a cooperative relationship. 
3.5 Alignment and harmonization of donor policies to support PRSs 
The alignment of donor policies with the PRS processes and the harmonization of donor prac-
tices are considered critical to the effectiveness and development cooperation – regardless of 
Box 4: Citizen report card tool in Ghana 
As part of the joint Department for international development (DFID) Ghana/World Bank Public and So-
cial Accountability Fund, the Comptroller and accountant general department (CAGD) in Ghana prepared 
a report on participatory audits.   CADG oversees the disbursement of all government funds, including 
HIPC and poverty related funds.  
In cooperation with the NGO Institute of Policy Alternatives, the Internal Audit (a unit within CAGD) 
used the Citizen Report Card (CRC) tool to carry out an impact assessment of government anti-poverty 
and HIPC projects in four pilot districts.  The purposes of this project were to:  
– Build capacity in the Internal Audit. 
– Make the CRC a regular complement to the normal financial audit. 
– Track government expenditures down to the level of local communities. 
– Assess the extent to which service providers involve civil society in planning and executing devel-
opment projects. 
– Assess the impact of government projects in local communities. 
– Enhance usage of projects sited in the communities. 
Build a platform by which civil society can express its opinion about government projects.  
In each of the four pilot districts, the Internal Audit and Institute of Policy Alternatives brought together 
local opinion leaders to assess the projects being examined.  Their views were then relayed to service pro-
viders, and draft reports were prepared for key stakeholders.  A forum was organized to bring together 
opinion leaders and service providers in each of the districts to discuss the issues raised and find solutions. 
The programme’s ultimate goal is to improve government accountability by expanding popular participa-
tion at the local level.  The project also seeks to inform service providers of what they need to do to en-
hance service delivery, ensure that communities’ development requirements are considered during the 
planning of the budget, and bridge the communication gap between communities and service providers. 
Source: The International Budget Project Website; online http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/ 
newsletter29.htm#ArgentinaGhana 
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the aid modalities (Lobb-Rabe et al. 2005). Recommended solutions to current alignment 
problems include: 
— To avoid the re-emergence of donor-driven agendas, partner countries need to introduce 
a medium-term action orientation to their PRSP process. This is to rectify the notion 
that so far, the large majority of PRSP processes have not provided a sufficient basis for 
aligning donor policies because they are too general.  
— Donors and partner countries have different interests and perspectives as regards devel-
opment cooperation. Alignment requires proper attention to both sides’ interests. Deep-
ening in-country analytical work can help here; such instruments as the Poverty and so-
cial impact analysis (PSIA) or Country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) are 
deemed especially suited to this task. 
— Extending in-country dialogue between government and civil society on major reform 
issues is strongly recommended – a process that might need to be jump-started by do-
nors in some countries. Various government and civil society stakeholders pursue dif-
ferent interests. When certain societal forces are left out of reform processes, they might 
try to block them.  
— A number of problems exist with conditionalities. While donors find them necessary, 
they threaten essential country ownership of PRSP processes and reform programmes. 
Too many conditionalities overburden country capacities, while it is not always easy for 
donors to assess their fulfilment. Therefore, partner governments and donors need to 
agree on medium-term development goals, but not on the details of how the countries 
will reach them. Other possible solutions to these dilemmas are: agreeing to limit the 
number of conditionalities, shifting from input to outcome conditionalities when possi-
ble, identifying target corridors as opposed to fixed values, and focusing on core politi-
cal actions. 
— Donor harmonization can create financing bottlenecks in the case of non-fulfilment of 
conditionalities. One way to deal with this is to combine fixed and variable disburse-
ment tranches as practiced by the European Union (EU).5 
— Harmonization presents many management and coordination challenges to the donors. 
Mechanisms that support a division of work amongst donor organizations based on their 
comparative advantages, such as delegated cooperation and silent partnerships, should 
be adopted. 
4 Dilemmas facing donors in promoting government accountability 
Admittedly, attempts by the donor community to assist in entrenching internal accountability 
are complex processes, fraught with misperception of their agenda. Many controversies have 
centred on country sovereignty and political party assistance, accountability priorities of for-
eign-funded CSOs, the extent to which assistance to CSOs actually at the expense of parlia-
ments poses a threat to democratic accountability of governments, and heterogeneity of do-
nors themselves whose activities are guided by political priorities of their governments.  
Some of these issues explain the reluctance of donors to participate in building capacities of 
parliaments even if it is in their interest to do so. In short, some of systems that need to be put 
                                                 
5  OECD/DAC (2003); ibid. 
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in place to strengthen PFM and accountability go beyond economics and finance. Hence, a 
total package of technical assistance must factor in political considerations. 
Additional to the controversial areas mentioned above, this section raises a number of other 
contentious areas and dilemmas that call for deeper debates and research. These are: 
Lack of local ownership. Despite commitment to “partner countries being in the drivers’ 
seat”, still donors want to determine direction. The international community has often faced 
criticism about the political party assistance it gives. Many commentators – journalists, writ-
ers, and academics – contend that foreign powers should not engage in activities that directly 
or indirectly affect election outcomes. 
Limited time horizon. While most assistance programmes for civil society and media are 
planned for five years, political party development projects tend to have a life span of only 
one or two years. One possible explanation is that party assistance is generally associated with 
elections in the minds of policy and decision makers in funding agencies. They finance party 
development activities when fresh elections are planned in a transition or war-torn society, but 
they lose interest in party assistance once elections are over. Perhaps this is also true of the 
political parties targeted by the assistance programmes. Unfortunately, party building is a long 
process. Training people, assistance to organizational development, and strengthening an en-
vironment favourable to multiparty democracy requires sustained assistance (Kumar 2004). 
Inclusiveness or selectivity. A practical issue with major political implications is the process 
of selecting the parties that will receive assistance. It is necessary to select certain parties be-
cause donors cannot marshal sufficient resources to assist all parties. Many developing and 
transitions countries have dozens of parties. The international community does not have e-
nough resources to assist each and every one of them. Even if sufficient resources did exist, it 
is doubtful if such a course would be optimal. Many existing parties have no realistic chance 
of becoming major players in the political arena. Others may advocate political and social 
goals that are incompatible with the ideals of democracy and pluralism. Still others may be 
dominated by a few leaders not exactly favourably disposed to good governance. 
Partisanship. Support to political parties that operate in a dominant party system – as is often 
the case in Africa – poses a tricky dilemma. In that situation, the choice is between supporting 
dominant parties, thereby institutionalising the dominant party system, or supporting weak 
parties that often have weak grassroots support.  
Balancing political party and civil society assistance. Balancing assistance for civil society 
and political parties is yet another tricky policy issue that has received little attention. To be 
sure, during the past two decades, CSOs have emerged as major actors in transition and post-
transition societies. They played a major role in promoting democratic transitions in Central 
and East European countries. They also contributed to the emergence of democratic institu-
tions in South Africa and East Asian countries. CSOs have been articulating the interests of 
different socio-economic groups and exerting pressure on governments to introduce social and 
political reforms all over the world. Where strong political parties do not exist, CSOs have 
taken up the roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by political parties. For the do-
nor community, it is easier to channel funds to non-partisan CSOs than to promote political 
parties or the organizations that support them. Moreover, civil society has acquired remark-
able expertise in developing funding proposals on topics and terms that seem to resonate well 
with the donor community. 
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Choosing proper channels in order to make aid more effective. Can this be achieved 
through governments or via CSOs or both? What are issues to take into consideration in mak-
ing a choice? Do all forms of new aid delivery modalities suit all LDCs equally? For  
example, when is it suitable to use project support rather than on-budget support?  
5 Conclusion 
External actors have welcomed democratisation across the African continent since the 1990s. 
On their part they have adopted or are considering new ways of dealing with poverty and a 
new kind of aid architecture that stresses country ownership, participation, enhancing trans-
parency and accountability and sustainability.  
On the whole, donor activities are promising to be supportive of the incipient democratic pro-
cess in the continent. Many donors (especially the NGOs and now increasingly donor gov-
ernments) are constructively using aid leverage to cajole recipient governments into recom-
mitting themselves to good governance when they experience lapses. The recent UK decision 
to withdraw budget support from Ethiopia and Kenya supports this conclusion (Economist 
2006). 
Notwithstanding this positive development, the new development approach has encountered 
hurdles: limited or no participation by the poor in policy making and budget discussions and 
implementation; there is still very strong external accountability of governments pursued at 
the expense of internal accountability; the prevalence of poverty programmes designed in 
secrecy and haste to meet timetables of external donors; and a general lack of local owner-
ship.  
In brief, the manner in which donors deliver aid under the new modalities may inadvertently 
undermine internal accountability. The cases in point are, first, the way the PRSP process has 
been conducted in a number of developing countries, and which many observers have found 
wanting in its participatory content, particularly the participation of the poor. Second, al-
though the direct budget support has registered some successes in some countries such as 
Uganda and Tanzania (KfW 2004), this mode of aid delivery is nonetheless faulted for the 
lack of monitoring by the ordinary citizens and the CSOs in a vast majority of countries. On 
the positive side, these programmes are well under the control of recipient government, but 
these governments tend to account solely to donors who also do the monitoring of expendi-
ture. 
Needless to say, donors are well aware of these hurdles and problems, and heated debates are 
now centred on ways to overcome them. First, how they can ‘do no harm’ to internal account-
ability processes that naturally accompany democratic processes. Second, what measures can 
they adopt to deepen governments’ accountability to their own citizens?  
As articulated in the Paris Declaration, some of the action plans needed to rectify this situa-
tion include three areas. First, donors must make new aid modalities to follow the path origi-
nally intended, namely avoiding bypassing participation by the poor. Second, they must col-
laborate more with extra-government state institutions such as parliaments and CSOs that 
exercise budget oversight. And, third, they need to help enhance the capacities of these insti-
tutions for enhanced vigilance over government fiscal activities. 
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A rising number of donors is on course to collaborating more with non-executive functionar-
ies and is providing the necessary skills. The recency of these efforts makes an assessment 
difficult to gauge at this stage. There is agreement however that these efforts need to be rein-
vigorated and sustained over a longer term to have visible and long lasting results. Further-
more, donors would have to deal head-on with politics and other country peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies for which many of them may be poorly equipped.  
There are thorny issues to contend with. These include mounting concerns about too much 
focus on CSOs who tend to have narrow and sectoral interests, to the detriment of institution-
alised state functionaries, particularly parliaments. Second, donors must discover creative 
ways to help to build capacities against the backdrop of diverse nature of parliaments while 
avoiding perceptions of partisanship, supporting essentially one-party states, promoting par-
liaments whose actions and ideologies are not in congruence with standard democratic princi-
ples, and where link between parliaments and ordinary people are blurred. 
Further to these dilemmas, aligning donor accountabilities to home countries while at the sa-
me time ensuring that their programmes are designed to be in line with partner countries’ own 
is proving a challenge. As a starting point donors are beginning the process of alignment of 
their own programmes as a group, a challenge in itself given their diversity. This harmonisa-
tion in donor aid efforts should help strengthen internal accountability through increased 
country ownership and more effective use of aid.  
Other dilemmas involve the choosing of aid modalities. Among these modalities there are 
many instruments such as poverty-reduction support credits, and poverty-reduction and 
growth strategies; and capacity building for PFM. Debates must go on as to which modality is 
preferable and under what circumstances. 
All in all, there is a general consensus that the current development approach is a vast im-
provement over past ways of fighting poverty. For this approach to deepen internal democ-
racy in sub-Saharan Africa in an accelerated and meaningful way, however, it needs further 
amendments. Hence, current debates on ways to achieve this goal should be welcomed. 
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